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Sharing the Wealth:  Dont Call Us.  Well 
Call You:  Why Revenue Sharing Is a 
Permissive Subject and Therefore the 
Labor Exemption Does Not Apply 
Jessica Cohen* 
INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of free agency to professional sports has 
contributed to increased competition among teams over top players.  
Professional team owners are bidding competitively at inflated 
market prices for highly desired players.1  Team owners do this with 
the hope that their franchises will win more games, resulting in 
increased profits.2  Thus, free agency has helped create an increasing 
disparity among professional sports teams, which often leads to a 
lower quality product.  To survive, leagues must use various 
mechanisms to equalize the competitive balance among teams, 
including revenue sharing, the salary cap, and the draft. 
 
* J.D. candidate 2002, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., University of Michigan at 
Ann Arbor.  Upon graduation, Jessica will work at Proskauer Rose LLP, in New York, New 
York.  She would like to thank Professor Lanzarone for all of his guidance and his support.  
She would also like to thank her family and friends for their patience. 
 1 See Mark Conrad, Marks View: A-Rod and Baseballs House of Cards, at 
http://www.sportslawnews.com/archive/Articles%202000/Arodcontract.htm (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2002).  In the 2000 season, Alex Rodriguez signed a 10-year $252 million contract 
with the Texas Rangers.  Id.  See also David Rothstein, The Salary Cap: Legal Analysis of 
and Practical Suggestions for Collective Bargaining in Professional Basketball, 11 U. 
MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 251 (1994) (specifically discussing the way NBA team 
owners are willing to open their checkbooks to acquire the top players); Jeffrey E. Levine, 
The Legality and Efficacy of the National Basketball Association Salary Cap, 11 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 73 (1992). 
 2 Rothstein, supra note 1, at 251-52 (noting that sports team owners pay the top players 
so that their teams will win more games, thereby increasing gate receipts). 
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This paper will focus on revenue sharing as one of the many 
solutions intended to balance competition among teams.  
Specifically, this paper will examine revenue sharing of income from 
external sources, such as television broadcast contracts, merchandise 
licensing, and gate receipts.3  The questions of whether revenue 
sharing is a mandatory or permissive subject of collective bargaining 
and whether the labor exemption applies to revenue sharing will be 
addressed. 
Part I surveys the labor history of collective bargaining as it relates 
to revenue sharing and the salary cap in selected professional sports 
leagues.  Part II focuses on the basics of labor and antitrust law, and 
their conflicting policies.  Part III investigates the statutory labor 
exemption, the evolution of the non-statutory labor exemption in the 
Supreme Court, and its application to professional sports.  Part IV 
analyzes whether revenue sharing is a mandatory or permissive 
subject of collective bargaining.  Finally, Part V focuses on whether 
the labor exemption applies to revenue sharing in two alternative 
hypothetical situations: first, when revenue sharing is categorized as 
a permissive subject and is in a labor agreement; and second, when 
revenue sharing is categorized as a mandatory subject that is 
unilaterally imposed after impasse. 
This paper argues that revenue sharing is a permissive subject of 
collective bargaining because revenue sharing does not directly 
affect the players terms and conditions of employment.4  This paper 
concludes that the labor exemption does not apply to revenue sharing 
if it is a permissive subject; however, if revenue sharing is found to 
be a mandatory subject, contrary to the conclusions of this paper, the 
labor exemption would apply.5 
 
 3 There are many different types of revenue sharing.  Although they are all crucial to 
the survival of a league, the only type discussed in this paper involves the sharing of 
external revenues, such as television contracts, gate receipts and merchandise licensing. 
 4 See infra Part IV. 
 5 See infra Part V. 
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I. EXAMPLES OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SELECTED SPORTS: THE 
NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION & MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 
A. National Basketball Association (hereinafter NBA) 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, with the increase in free agency, 
the NBA experienced growing competitive disparity among its 
teams.  To solve this problem,6 in 1983 the NBA and the National 
Basketball Players Association (hereinafter NBPA) negotiated the 
first-ever salary cap in professional sports.7  The key to the salary 
cap was a revenue-sharing formula that guaranteed the players 53% 
of the leagues gross revenues.The parties hoped that this would 
enable small-market, financially weaker teams to compete with their 
big-market rivals.  Over time, however, it became increasingly 
obvious that the many loopholes of the soft cap8 made it easy for 
creative owners to circumvent the cap.9  Following a 191-day labor 
dispute, on January 7, 1999, the NBA and the NBPA reached an 
agreement that purported to rectify some of these loopholes through 
a revised team salary cap10 and an individual cap.11 
 
 6 See D. Albert Daspin, Of Hoops, Labor Dupes and Antitrust Ally-Oops: Fouling Out 
the Salary Cap, 62 IND. L.J. 95, 122 (1986).  The purpose of the provision was to level the 
competition among NBA teams.  Id. 
 7 Rothstein, supra note 1, at 252 n.6. 
 8 The soft cap is one in which teams can use creative accounting to shift player 
salaries to other years to make room in the cap to sign new players. 
 9 Dan Messeloff, Note, The NBAs Deal with the Devil: The Antitrust Implications of 
the 1999 NBA-NBPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 521, 523 (2000). 
 10 Although the revised team salary cap is still a soft cap, it restricted the amount of 
money a team could spend on its roster to no more than $30 million in 1999 and $34 million 
in 2000.  See also Messeloff, supra note 9, at 523. 
 11 The individual salary cap limits the amount that a team can spend on a single player. 
For example, a player that has up to five years of experience in the NBA can earn no more 
than $9 million.  Mike Wise, Pro Basketball: The Settlement; With Little Time on Clock, 
N.B.A. and Players Settle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1999, at A1.  Unlike the revised team salary 
cap that is a soft cap, this is a hard cap and there are virtually no exceptions.  Id. 
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B. Major League Baseball (hereinafter MLB) 
In the summer of 1994, MLB and the Major League Baseball 
Players Association (hereinafter MLBPA) could not agree on a 
solution to the economic disparity and competitive imbalance in 
MLB.12  The owners claimed that they would not open spring 
training without a salary cap, while the players maintained that they 
would not start the season with a salary cap.13  So in August 1994, 
MLB had its eighth work stoppage in twenty-five years.  In 
December of that year, with no settlement reached, the owners 
unilaterally imposed their salary cap.  In 1995, the National Labor 
Relations Board (hereinafter NLRB) General Counsel warned the 
owners that their action was illegal because they had not reached 
impasse.14  Those words of advice caused the owners to bring 
baseball back for the 1995 season without a salary cap.15 
In November 1996, MLB and the MLBPA negotiated a new 
Collective Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter CBA).  Even though 
a luxury tax16 was implemented, the system did not correct the 
 
 12 Mark Conrad, Marks Sports Law News, Owners Give Selig Powers to Share 
Revenues, Reject Trades (January 20, 2000), at http://www.sportslawnews.com/ 
archive/Articles%202000/Seligpowers.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2002); Charles D. Marvine, 
Comment, Baseballs Unilaterally Imposed Salary Cap: This Baseball Cap Doesnt Fit, 43 
KAN. L. REV. 625 n.1 (1995) (citing Richard Justice, With Baseballs Last Out, a Strike, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1994, at A1); Marcus Leazer, Marks Sports Law News, Baseballs 
Rich Get Richer (No Surprise!) (Dec. 9, 2000), at http://www.sportslawnews.com/ 
archive/Articles%202000/Seligtestimony.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2002). 
 13 Marvine, supra note 12, at 626; Mark Maske, Baseball Season Wiped Out; Team 
Owners Cancel Remaining Schedule and World Series, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1994, at A1, 
A6; Mark Maske, Baseballs Labor Talks Collapse; Team Owners Install Salary Cap 
System; Litigation Looms, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1994, at A1. 
 14 Paul C. Weiler, A Principled Reshaping of Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century, 3 
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177, 191 n.32 (2001). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Although it wasnt called a salary cap, the luxury tax acted like a salary cap in 
that it was a cost-containment plan on player salaries. The luxury tax instituted a system 
where the five teams with the highest payrolls above a certain threshold (in 1997 - $51 
million; in 1998 - $55 million; in 1999 - $58.9 million; and there was no luxury tax for 
2000) were required to pay a tax on the excess amount (in 1997 and 1998  35%; in 1999  
34%).  The money was paid into a revenue-sharing fund that was redistributed among the 
thirteen small-market teams. Messeloff, supra note 9, at 562. 
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disparities in professional baseball.17  Since the CBA expired in 
2001, the parties are now in a position to decide how to negotiate a 
new, more efficacious system. 
In anticipation of these daunting problems, MLB appointed a panel 
of experts, the Blue Ribbon Panel (hereinafter Panel),18 to review 
the state of professional baseball and recommend some solutions. 19  
In July of 2000, the Panel recommended that for the good of 
professional baseball, the owners should pool some of their 
resources.20  The Panel issued a ninety-three-page report that 
suggested various solutions, including a system in which clubs would 
share 40 to 50% of all local revenues, which would provide 
assistance to the financially weaker franchises.21  The Panel also 
suggested that a 50% competitive-balance tax be instituted whenever 
teams would spend above the specified threshold of $84 million.22  In 
addition, the Panel recommended that all teams spend a minimum of 
$40 million on player salaries.23    In  this   proposed   system,   low-
revenue  teams  would  receive resources from an expanded central 
 
 17 Messeloff, supra, note 9, at 562.  In 1999, the New York Yankees spent $92 million 
on their player payroll and paid $4.8 million in luxury taxes.  It is apparent that the luxury 
tax did not deter the Yankees in their pursuit to bid for top market free agents.  Another 
criticism of the luxury tax is that there are no requirements on small-market teams use of 
the money.  This results in little or no effect on the competitive balance of the teams.  It has 
been argued that a way to rectify this is to provide incentives for small-market clubs to 
reinvest the proceeds from the revenue sharing system into their rosters.  Id. at 561. 
 18 The Report of the Independent Members of the Commissioners Blue Ribbon Panel 
on Baseball Economics, July 2000 (R. Levin, G. Mitchell, P. Volcker, G. Will) [hereinafter 
Blue Ribbon Panel] (on file with author).  The Panel was comprised of Yale University 
President Richard C. Levin, former Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell, political 
commentator George F. Will and former Federal Reserve Chair Paul A. Volcker.  There 
were no representatives of either the league or the players association on the Panel.  Id. at 1. 
 19 The Panel found some disturbing facts, including: clubs with payrolls in the upper 
half of the league have won every playoff game since 1994; and nine of the ten clubs 
participating in the last five World Series had payrolls ranking in the top 25% of the league.  
Id. at 10. 
 20 Andrew Goodman, Marks Sports Law News: Baseball Commission Calls for More 
Revenue Sharing (July 18, 2000), at http://www.sportslawnews.com/archive/ 
Articles%202000/MLBreport.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2002). 
 21 Blue Ribbon Panel, supra note 18, at 14. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
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fund of pooled local revenues to aid in balancing the competition.24 
It is unclear whether MLB will choose to adopt some or all of 
these proposed solutions; however, something must be done to save 
professional baseball from its current state of competitive imbalance.  
At this time, few teams other than the New York Yankees can meet 
the salary demands of the most desired free agents in professional 
baseball.25  During the current off-season, Jason Giambi signed a 
seven-year contract worth $120 million with the Yankees.26  Last 
season, the Yankees payroll for pitchers alone reached $40 million, 
a sum that exceeded the entire payroll of eight MLB teams.27 
Competitive-balancing systems must be scrutinized to determine 
whether they are consistent with labor and antitrust laws.  The 
application of these laws may be in conflict with each other.  
Therefore, the impact of these statutes on the professional sports 
industry must be analyzed. 
II. LABOR AND ANTITRUST LAW IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 
In analyzing the application of federal labor and antitrust law to 
the professional sports industry, it is important to remember that the 
sports context is unique in several ways.  Unlike almost any other 
industry, in order for any sport to succeed, clubs that compete on the 
 
 24 Local revenues (gate receipts, television, radio, ballpark concessions, advertising, 
publications, parking, suite rentals, post-season and training) are the largest single 
component of most clubs annual revenue.  The ratio between the teams with the highest and 
lowest revenues has more than doubled between 1995 and 2000.  It is likely that this 
provision will make up the difference in competitive balance among the teams because this 
is where the large discrepancy in team revenue lies.  Id. at 8, 15. 
 25 Between 1994 and 1999, only three teams made a profit: the New York Yankees, the 
Cleveland Indians and the Colorado Rockies.  The rest of the MLB teams have                  
lost a total of $1.4 billion dollars.  Andrew Goodman, Marks Sports Law News:      
Baseball Commission Calls for More Revenue Sharing (July 18, 2000), at 
http://www.sportslawnews.com/archive/Articles%202000/MLBreport.htm (last visited Feb. 
10, 2002). 
 26 Mark Feinsand, Its Official: Giambi a Yankee; Slugger Signs Seven-Year             
Deal, MLB.COM (Dec. 13, 2001), at http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/news/ 
mlb_news_story.jsp?article_id=mlb_20011213_giambi_news&team_id=mlb (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2002). 
 27 Leazer, supra note 12. 
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field must cooperate, to some extent, off the field.28  In most other 
industries, each business owner is concerned solely with its own 
success.  In contrast, in the sports industry each teams success is 
dependent upon the success of the other teams in the league, which 
in turn improves the product.29 
The professional sports industry is also unique because unlike 
most other employment situations, the employer has the power to 
implement labor-market restraints on its employees. 30  Although 
these restraints might otherwise compell employees to find 
alternative sources of employment, due to a limited source of 
alternative employers, the restraints remain.  This is known as a 
monopsony.  Monopsonies arise when the resource is uniquely 
valuable in its current use, so that even if the price is depressed by 
monopsony, sellers [players] are unable to find alternative buyers 
[professional sports leagues].31  For example, professional football 
players do not have an equivalent alternative to the National Football 
League (hereinafter NFL).  While they might have other options in 
the Arena Football League and the like, those types of opportunities 
do not compare financially or competitively.  Therefore, if the NFL 
were to implement an unfavorable restraint, NFL players would not 
have leverage to leave the League.  Rather, much of their leverage is 
from labor and antitrust legal challenges.32 
Lastly, the industry of professional sports presents a situation 
wherein the fundamental federal policies of antitrust and labor law 
are in conflict with one another.  Antitrust law bars any unreasonable 
agreements in restraint of trade, whereas labor law organizes the 
 
 28 Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117-
18 (1984) (explaining that a certain degree of cooperation is necessary if the type of 
competition that the NCAA seeks to market is to be preserved); United States v. Natl 
Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (explaining that the professional 
sports industry is unique because competitors cannot compete too hard with each other off-
the-field or it would likely lead to financial failure). 
 29 Rothstein, supra note 1, at 271 (citing Donald G. Kempf, Jr., The Misapplication of 
Antitrust Law to Professional Sports Leagues, 32 DEPAUL L. REV. 625, 628 (1983)). 
 30 Marvine, supra note 12, at 648. 
 31 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J., 
dissenting), affd, 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
 32 Brown, 50 F.3d 1041 (Wald, J., dissenting); Marvine, supra note 12, at 648. 
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efforts of employees, usually in the form of an agreement, against 
their employer.33  The following section will provide a brief 
introduction to antitrust and labor law. 
A. Antitrust Law 
Antitrust law is primarily embodied in the Sherman Act.34  Section 
1 of the Sherman Act states, every contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal.35  The Supreme Court has determined that 
only unreasonable restraints of trade violate the Sherman Act.36  
Courts apply two different standards to decide if a challenged 
restraint is in violation of the antitrust laws.  They are: a) rule of 
reason, or b) per se.  Under the rule of reason, a court will do a 
comprehensive analysis of the restraints effect on market 
competition by balancing its pro-competitive and anti-competitive 
effects.37  Alternatively, the per se rule provides that certain restraints 
are so anti-competitive by nature that they are inherently illegal.38 
 
 33 PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES, 
PROBLEMS 189 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter SPORTS LAW TEXT]. 
 34 E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY, AND 
PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1994). 
 35 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997). 
 36 Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 
(1984) (recognizing that because all contracts are restraints of trade, Congress must have 
intended the Sherman Act to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade); Bd. of Trade of 
City of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United 
States, 221 U.S. 1, 63 (1911). 
 37 Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.  Specifically, to evaluate a restraint under a Rule of 
Reason analysis, a court should look at whether the restraint merely regulates and promotes 
competition, or suppresses and destroys competition.  Id. 
 38 Under a per se analysis, a court could determine that the restraint violates the 
Sherman Act without an inquiry into the harm that the restraint causes in the relevant 
market.  In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940), the Court 
determined that any conspiracy to fix prices was a per se violation of the Sherman Act, even 
if the plaintiff could not show that the defendants had enough market power. 
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B. Labor Law 
The National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter NLRA or the 
Act) was passed in 1935.39  The Act established an administrative 
body, the NLRB, to serve two main functions: a) to run elections for 
the selection of a bargaining agent; and b) to adjudicate unfair labor 
practice (hereinafter ULP) charges.40  The purposes of the Act are: 
a) to protect the public from industrial unrest that could lead to work 
stoppages; b) to facilitate the peaceful negotiation of labor-
management disputes over wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment; and c) to ensure equal bargaining power 
between employers and employees for collective bargaining. 41 
The Act requires that the employer bargain with the union.42  This 
duty applies to mandatory subjects of collective bargaining such as 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.43  The 
 
 39 The NLRA, also known as the Wagner Act, was originally passed in 1935.  The 1947 
Amendments established the NLRB.  National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-
198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)).  See also THE 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
ACT 26-27 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992). 
 40 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Section 8(d) of the NLRA provides that: 
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of mutual obligation of the employer 
and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising there under, and the execution 
of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if request by either 
party, but such an obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession. 
Section 8(d) of the NLRA.  Some labor scholars have noticed, however, that going through 
the motions of negotiating undermines collective bargaining just as much as bluntly 
withholding recognition.  Archibald Cox, The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. 
L. REV. 1401, 1413 (1958); Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and 
the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351 (1984).  There must be a 
distinction between surface bargaininggoing through the motions with no real intent to 
arrive at a settlement, which is unacceptableand hard bargainingto stand on the ground 
of its negotiating position, which is totally permitted by the NLRA.  SPORTS LAW TEXT, 
supra note 33, at 273. 
 43 The duty to bargain only applies to mandatory subjects because of their increased 
importance to the employer/employee relationship. 
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duty to bargain includes the obligation to act in good faith.44  The 
requirement to bargain over mandatory subjects remains in effect up 
until the collective bargaining negotiations break down.45  The 
breakdown in negotiations is known as impasse.46  Once impasse 
has occurred, the employer is permitted to unilaterally impose 
conditions, provided that they do not differ from pre-impasse 
proposals.47  However, the duty to bargain may arise once again after 
the breakdown when there is a reason for the parties to negotiate 
again, such as when one of the parties has changed its position.48 
The subjects that are not mandatory are either illegal or 
permissive.49  Illegal subjects are those that violate any law.50  
Permissive subjects include all subjects that are neither mandatory 
nor illegal.51  Permissive subjects present different circumstances 
than mandatory subjects for two significant reasons.  First, the 
employer has no duty to discuss these topics, or to supply 
information about them to the union.  Second, the union will not be 
 
 44 NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943) (describing 
the duty as an . . . obligation of the parties to participate actively in the deliberations so as 
to indicate a present intention to find a basis for agreement, and a sincere effort must be 
made to reach a common ground.). 
 45 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (even after bargaining has broken 
down in good faith, the duty to bargain survives and the employer must be ready to resume 
collective bargaining). 
 46 In Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1982), the Court 
defined impasse as a temporary deadlock or hiatus in negotiations which in almost all cases 
is eventually broken, through either a change of mind or the application of economic force.  
Id. at 412. 
 47 In NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), the Court held that the employer violated the 
requirement in 8(a)(5) to bargain in good faith by unilaterally implementing policies with 
regard to mandatory subjects of collective bargaining (sick leave, increased wages, and 
merit increases) without prior discussion of those proposals.  According to the Court, if the 
parties had not reached impasse, the unilateral imposition of mandatory terms amounts to a 
refusal to negotiate and is a unfair labor practice. 
 48 Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc., 454 U.S. at 412 (citing Charles B. Bonanno 
Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 243 NLRB 1093, 1093-94 (1979)) (impasse is broken either 
through a change of mind or the application of economic force). 
 49 First Natl Maint. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 675 n.13 (1981); NLRB v. Wooster Div. 
Of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). 
 50 NLRB v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 798 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing 29 U.S.C.A. § 
158 (a)(5); 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(3)) (noting that illegal subjects cannot be bargained over 
or insisted upon by either party). 
 51 First Natl Maint., 452 U.S. at 675, n.13; Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342. 
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protected if it strikes or demands that management bargain over 
these subjects.52  The duty to bargain does not extend to decisions 
that involve a change in the scope and direction of the enterprise,53 
or those that lie at the core of entrepreneurial control,54 even if the 
decisions have a direct impact on employment.  This allows 
management the ability to make fundamental business decisions 
unencumbered.  However, the employer still has an obligation to 
bargain over the effects of its business decisions on the employees.55 
III. THE LABOR EXEMPTION 
As illustrated in Part II, labor and antitrust law have fundamentally 
different policies; hence, they may be in conflict in their application 
to employer-employee relationships.  Specifically, if antitrust laws 
were to apply to the conduct of all professional sports leagues, the 
leagues and players associations would not be able to collectively 
bargain.  Furthermore, systems that were created in an attempt to 
even out the competitive imbalance among sports teams (such as 
revenue sharing), would not be implemented, due to the threat of 
antitrust liability.  Therefore, some accommodations had to be made.  
The labor exemption enables unions and management to negotiate 
over conditions of employment without fear of an antitrust 
violation.56 
 
 52 In NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) an employer refused to agree to 
the collective bargaining agreement unless the union agreed to a pre-strike voting provision 
and the recognition of an additional union.  Id. at 343.  The NLRB and the Supreme Court 
found that the provision did not involve wages, hours, or terms of employment within the 
meaning of 8(d) of the NLRA and therefore the employer violated the labor laws by 
insisting on a permissive subject.  Id. at 349-50. 
 53 First Natl Maint. Corp., 452 U.S. at 677. 
 54 Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223, 226 (1964). 
 55 In First Natl Maint. Corp., 452 U.S. 666 (1981), the Supreme Court held that the 
employer had a duty to bargain about the effects of their decision to terminate a contract 
with one of its commercial customers, even though they had no duty to bargain about the 
actual decision to terminate the contract since the decision was for purely economic reasons. 
 56 Mid-Am. Regl Bargaining Assn v. Will Cty. Carpenters Dist. Council, 675 F.2d 
881, 890 n.22 (7th Cir. 1982) (The exemptions would serve little purpose in furthering 
national labor policy if employers risked liability under the antitrust laws for entering into 
collective bargaining agreements.). 
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There are two different labor exemptions from antitrust law  
statutory and non-statutory.  In the following section, the statutory 
labor exemption and the limited scope of its application will be 
described.  Next, the purpose of the non-statutory labor exemption 
will be reviewed.  In the third part, two precedent-setting Supreme 
Court cases will be examined to reveal the foundation of the non-
statutory exemption.  Finally, the non-statutory labor exemption will 
be described as it has been applied in a few key sports cases. 
A. The Statutory Labor Exemption 
The statutory labor exemption from antitrust laws reflects the 
federal governments strong interest in preserving the national labor 
policy.57  This exemption asserts that labor unions are not 
 
 57 The labor exemption exists in various sections of the antitrust laws.  15 U.S.C. § 17 
(1982); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 105 (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 
113 (1982).  These provisions include: 
Section 6 of the 1914 Clayton Act: 
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.  Nothing 
contained in the antitrust law shall be construed to forbid the existence and 
operation of labor . . . organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help . . . 
or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully 
carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the 
members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in 
restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982).  Section 20 of the Clayton Act: 
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United 
States . . . involving or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of 
employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a 
property right, of the party making the application, for which injury there is no 
adequate remedy at law. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982).  Section 104 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act: 
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order 
or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any 
labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such 
dispute . . . from doing . . . any of the following act: (a) Ceasing or refusing to 
perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment; (b) Becoming or 
remaining a member of any labor organization, or of any employer organization, 
regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is described in section 103 of this 
title. 
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combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade under section 1 of 
the Sherman Act.58  Other parts of the statutory labor exemption 
protect collective action by a union, such as strikes, picketing, and 
boycotts.59 
The statutory exemption establishes that labor unions are not 
conspiracies or combinations in restraint of trade, and it protects 
collective activity by unions furthering union interests and labor 
policy, even where it is anti-competitive.60  The statutory labor 
 
 
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1982).  Section 105 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act: 
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a restraining order or 
temporary or permanent injunction upon the ground that any of the persons 
participating or interested in a labor dispute constitute or are engaged in an 
unlawful combination or conspiracy because of the doing in concert of the acts 
enumerated in section 104 of this title. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 105 (1982).  Section 113 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act: 
A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the case 
involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation; 
or have direct, or indirect interests therein, or who are employees of the same 
employer; or who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of 
employers or employees; whether such dispute is (a) between one or more 
employers or associations of employers and one or more employees or associations 
of employees; (2) between one or more employers or association of employers; or 
(3) between one or more employees or associations of employees and one or more 
employees and associations of employees; or when the case involves any 
conflicting or competing interests in a labor dispute . . . of persons participating 
or interested therein . . . (b) A person or association shall be held to be a person 
participating or interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it, and 
if he or it is engaged in the same industry therein, or is a member, officer or agent 
of any association composed in whole or in part of employers, or employees 
engaged in such industry, trade, craft or occupation. (c) The term labor dispute 
includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or 
concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, 
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment 
regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of 
employer and employee. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 113 (1982). 
 58 See supra note 57 (§ 6 of the Clayton Act); see also supra note 36 and accompanying 
text. 
 59 See supra note 57 (§ 20 of the Clayton Act); see also SPORTS LAW TEXT, supra note 
33, at 190-91. 
 60 Mackey v. Natl Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 611 (8th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 801 (1977); Marvine, supra note 12, at 638. 
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exemption does not cover concerted activity or agreements when a 
labor organization ceases to act as a labor group or when it enters 
into an illegal combination with a non-labor group.61  While it may 
seem counter-intuitive, the statutory labor exemption enables union 
activity to obtain a labor agreement, such as a strike, even though it 
does not protect the collective bargaining agreement.62  The narrow 
scope of the statutory labor exemption is problematic in most 
industries, including professional sports.  As a result, the Supreme 
Court developed the non-statutory labor exemption to cover other 
legitimate labor practices not covered in the statutory labor 
exemption. 
B. The Purpose of the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption 
The non-statutory labor exemption was created by the Supreme 
Court to extend the labor exemption to collective bargaining 
activities not covered in the statutes.63  The Supreme Court said, 
[I]t would be difficult, if not impossible, to require groups 
of employers and employees to bargain together, but at the 
same time to forbid them to make among themselves, or 
with each other, any of the competition-restricting 
agreements potentially necessary to make the process 
work or its result mutually acceptable.64 
This exemption covers certain union-employer collective 
bargaining agreements, and has been used as a defense by sports
 
 61 Norris-LaGuardia Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 101; H.A. Artists & Assocs., Inc. v. Actors 
Equity Assn, 451 U.S. 704, 714-15 (1981) (explaining that statutory antitrust immunity is 
forfeited when a union combines with one or more employers in an effort to restrain trade); 
see also United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941).  The statutory exemption 
does not apply when a union combines with a non-labor group.  Id. 
 62 SPORTS LAW TEXT, supra note 33, at 190-91. 
 63 See infra Part III-C. 
 64 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 237 (1996). 
COHEN.FINAL 2/15/02  3:00 PM 
2002] WHY REVENUE SHARING IS A PERMISSIVE SUBJECT 623 
 
leagues in many antitrust challenges by players and players 
associations.65 
C. Supreme Court Precedent for the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption 
The Supreme Court was the first to extend the non-statutory labor 
exemption to collective bargaining agreements between employers 
and unions.66  As discussed previously, there are conflicting interests 
between labor and antitrust laws.  On the one hand, labor policy 
preserves the rights of a union to better its conditions through 
collective bargaining.67  On the other hand, the chief purpose of 
antitrust law is to prevent collective, anti-competitive behavior.68  
The Courts conclusions suggest that where labor policies are 
advanced properly, anti-competitive market interference will be 
tolerated. 
The next section will review Local 189, Amalgamated Meat 
Cutters and Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Jewel Tea, Inc.69 and 
Connell Construction Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 
Union No. 100,70 two Supreme Court cases that have addressed the 
non-statutory labor exemption. 
 
 65 Brown, 518 U.S. 231; Natl Basketball Assn v. Williams, 45 F. 3d 684 (2d Cir. 
1995); Wood v. Natl Basketball Assn, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987); McCourt v. California 
Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Mackey v. Natl Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 
611-12 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen 
of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 729-30 (1965)); Powell v. Natl 
Football League, 690 F. Supp. 812 (D. Minn. 1988). 
 66 Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 
(1975); Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676 (1965); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 
U.S. 657 (1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Intl Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 
U.S. 797 (1945). 
 67 Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 806. 
 68 THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS 
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 1.02 (3d ed. 1994) (discussing the broad policy reasons for the 
antitrust laws). 
 69 381 U.S. 676 (1965). 
 70 421 U.S. 616 (1975). 
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1. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen 
of North America v. Jewel Tea, Inc. 
In Jewel Tea, 71 the Plaintiff, a meat retailer and a member of a 
multi-employer bargaining unit, challenged a marketing-hours 
restriction incorporated in an industry-wide collective bargaining 
agreement.  The Defendant Union, as a representative of butchers in 
the Chicago area, insisted on a provision that restricted the sale of 
fresh meat to daytime hours, to protect the unionized butchers from 
employer pressures to work at night.  The Plaintiff claimed the 
restriction violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by impeding 
his ability to compete freely and effectively in the product market.  
Justice White, writing for the Supreme Court, held that because the 
marketing-hours restriction furthered national labor policy and was a 
mandatory subject of collective bargaining negotiated through arms-
length bargaining, the union-employer agreement was exempt from 
antitrust scrutiny.72 
2. Connell Construction v. Plumbers & Steamfitters 
In Connell,73 the Union picketed and then contracted with Connell, 
a general contractor, to subcontract work only to firms that had a 
current agreement with the Defendant Union.  At the time of the 
contract, Connell did not have any employees that were represented 
by the Union.  The contract made the employee non-members of the 
Defendant Union ineligible to compete for Connells available work.  
Although the Court recognized the need for a limited non-statutory 
exemption from antitrust scrutiny,74 the Unions goal, which was to 
efficiently organize as many subcontractors as possible, did not serve 
to further the labor policies of the non-statutory labor exemption.75  
The restraint dealt with, and adversely affected, non-members of the 
Defendant Union, which failed to promote labor policy, i.e., to 
 
 71 381 U.S. 676 (1965). 
 72 Id. at 689-92. 
 73 421 U.S. 616 (1975). 
 74 Id. at 622. 
 75 Id. at 624-25. 
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accomplish union objectives for its own members.76  In addition, the 
restraint had substantial anti-competitive consequences on the 
industry.  It contravene[d] antitrust policies to a degree not justified 
by congressional labor policy, and therefore [could not] claim a non-
statutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws.77  While the 
Court recognized that the goals of federal labor law could never be 
achieved if ordinary anti-competitive effects of collective bargaining 
were held to violate the antitrust laws, these circumstances were very 
different.  Thus, the Court recognized the existence of the non-
statutory labor exemption, but held that it did not apply. 
D. The Application of the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption to Sports 
The professional sports industry has had numerous opportunities to 
test the scope of the non-statutory labor exemption.  Many sports 
cases involved legal challenges to league attempts to even out the 
competitive imbalance among teams by such means as revenue 
sharing, the salary cap, and the draft.  Relying on the Supreme 
Courts guidance as to the scope of the non-statutory labor 
exemption, lower courts have applied the non-statutory labor 
exemption to professional sports.  The following section focuses on 
the standards developed by two different circuits in Mackey v. 
National Football League78 and Wood v. National Basketball 
Association,79 and then discusses the Supreme Courts refinement of 
the application of the non-statutory labor exemption in Brown v. Pro 
Football, Inc.80 
1. Mackey v. National Football League 
In Mackey,81 several NFL players filed a lawsuit against the 
League, its member teams, and the NFL commissioner.  They 
 
 76 Id. at 622. 
 77 Id. at 623. 
 78 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 79 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 80 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
 81 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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challenged what was known as the Rozelle Rule, which required a 
franchise signing a player who had played out his option year to 
compensate the players former franchise in the form of cash, player 
contracts, or draft picks.  Although the Rozelle Rule had been in 
effect during the 1968 and 1970 collective bargaining agreements, 
the Players Association rejected the provision when the 1970 
contract expired. 
Relying on the establishment of the non-statutory labor exemption 
by the Supreme Court,82 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
developed and applied a three-prong test (hereinafter Mackey Test) 
to determine when a labor-management agreement in the sports 
industry would be afforded non-statutory immunity from antitrust 
review.83  First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may 
potentially be given pre-eminence over the antitrust laws where the 
restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties to the collective 
bargaining relationship.84  Second, federal labor policy is 
implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the agreement sought to 
be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of collective 
bargaining.85  And third, the policy favoring collective bargaining 
is furthered to the degree necessary to override the antitrust laws 
only where the agreement sought to be exempted is a product of bona 
fide arms-length bargaining.86 
In applying the Mackey Test, the court held that the Rozelle Rule 
did not fall within the non-statutory labor exemption and was 
 
 82 See supra Part III-C. 
 83 Mackey, 543 F. 2d at 613.  In doing so, the court affirmed the notion that the non-
statutory labor exemption is applicable to an employer, even though that is a non-labor 
group, when the circumstances furthered federal labor policy.  Id. at 612-13 (relying on 
Scooper Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 847 n.14 (3d Cir. 1974) (stating: We 
reject Scooper Doopers contention that the labor exemption is unavailable to employers . . . 
To preserve the integrity of the negotiating process, employers who bargain in good faith 
must be entitled to claim the antitrust exemption.)).  See also Phil. World Hockey Club, 
Inc. v. Phil. Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 499 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
 84 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 613 (citing Connell Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 
Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1976); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 
657 (1965); Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. 
Jewel Tea, Inc. 381 U.S. 676 (1965)). 
 85 Id. (citing Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676; Pennington, 381 U.S. 657). 
 86 Id. (citing Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676). 
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therefore subject to antitrust review.87  The court found that the 
provision passed prong one, that the Rozelle Rule affected only the 
parties to the bargaining relationship.  Similarly, it passed prong two, 
because it was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.  
However, the court found that it failed prong three, stating that the 
Rozelle Rule had not been the subject of bona fide arms-length 
bargaining for either the 1968 or the 1970 agreement, because the 
provision imposed significant restrictions on the players to which 
they would never have agreed in good faith bargaining.  Even though 
the NFL claimed that the provision was quid pro quo for the right of 
players to negotiate their own salaries and for increased pension 
benefits, the court determined that there was no such quid pro quo, 
and that there had been inadequate arms-length bargaining.88 
2. Wood v. National Basketball Association 
In Wood,89 Leon Wood, a successful college basketball player, 
brought an antitrust suit alleging that certain provisions of the 
agreement between the NBA and the NBPA, including the salary 
cap, college draft, and prohibition of player corporations, constituted 
a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.  The salary cap provided 
that if a team went over the cap, it was only permitted to offer a new 
player a one-year contract for the minimum salary of $75,000.  Even 
though Wood was a first-round draft pick of the Philadelphia 
Seventy-Sixers, the team was already over the cap, so it was forced 
to offer him the minimum salary.  Wood brought this suit claiming 
that he would suffer the irreparable injury of either:  a) being forced 
to sign at far below his market value, or b) having to forego playing 
basketball altogether for one year. 
The district court found that the provisions affected only the 
parties to the collective bargaining agreement, and involved 
mandatory subjects of bargaining.  It also found that the provisions 
 
 87 Id. at 616 (finding that the Rozelle Rule contravenes the rule of reason and therefore 
is an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act). 
 88 Id. at 615-16. 
 89 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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were the result of bona fide collective bargaining.90  The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district courts determination 
that the non-statutory labor exemption applied. 
Judge Winter, writing for the court, denied Woods claim that he 
could have received his full market value absent the salary cap 
because that argument was at odds with federal labor policy.91  An 
individual member of a union seeking to challenge a labor agreement 
runs contrary to one of the fundamental policies of labor law, that is, 
that employees may eliminate individual-competition through the 
selection of an exclusive bargaining representative.92  National labor 
policy favors the collective bargaining agreement over individual 
needs. 93  Therefore, Wood had no right to bargain on his own behalf 
since it would have violated the collective bargaining agreement. 
Judge Winter rejected Woods argument that the draft and salary 
cap were illegal because they affected employees outside the 
bargaining unit, such as players in the draft who were not yet in the 
NBA.94  The court determined that the term employee included 
those outside the bargaining unit.95  For these reasons, the restraints 
were shielded from antitrust scrutiny. 
 
 90 Wood v. Natl Basketball Assn, 602 F. Supp. 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) affd, 809 
F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987). The district court applied the Mackey Test to find that the labor 
exemption applied. 
 91 Wood, 809 F.2d at 959-60 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 92 Id. at 959 (citing NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967)). 
Federal labor policy thus allows employees to seek the best deal for the greatest 
number by the exercise of collective rather than individual bargaining power.  
Once an exclusive representative has been selected, the individual employee is 
forbidden by federal law from negotiating directly with the employer absent the 
representatives consent, even though that employee may actually receive less 
compensation under the collective bargaining agreement than he or she would 
through individual negotiations. 
See also 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).  Section 9(a) of the NLRA states, representatives . . . 
selected . . . by the majority of the employees in a unit . . . shall be the exclusive 
representatives of all the employees in such unit for purposes of collective bargaining.  J.I. 
Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). 
 93 Wood, 809 F.2d at 961. 
 94 Id. at 960 (refuting Woods argument that the draft and salary cap are illegal because 
they affect employees outside the bargaining unit by saying that the NLRA explicitly 
defines employee to include workers outside the bargaining unit). 
 95 Wood, 809 F.2d at 960. 
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The test used in Wood and the Mackey Test, though differently 
formulated, are not necessarily contradictory.  In Wood, Judge 
Winter recognized the similarities and differences between his 
decision and others.  He wrote, [v]irtually all of the courts that have 
addressed the present issues have reached a conclusion similar to 
ours, although on somewhat different grounds.96  The main factual 
difference between these cases is that in Wood, the existing 
collective bargaining agreement contained challenged provisions, 
whereas in Mackey, the collective bargaining agreement that 
contained the challenged provisions had expired.  The Mackey court 
concluded that the labor exemption did not apply because the 
provision had not been properly negotiated before the agreement had 
expired.  Therefore, it would be impossible to predict the outcome of 
either case if the facts had been different, such as if there had been a 
valid agreement in effect, or if the NFL had negotiated the Rozelle 
Rule to impasse before implementing it. 
In Part V, Section B, this paper will address the issue of whether 
the labor exemption is applicable in the event that a mandatory 
subject has been negotiated to impasse and unilaterally implemented 
by the employer.  To have reached impasse, the parties would have 
had to have participated in bona fide, good-faith bargaining, thus 
presenting a factual situation different from Mackey.97  Fortunately, 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.98 
and provided more guidance and clarity on this question. 
3. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. 
In Brown,99 the club owners wanted to institute a policy permitting 
 
 96 Id. at 962 n.6 (citing McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); 
Mackey v. Natl Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976)). 
 97 See supra Part III-D-1.  In Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th 
Cir. 1976), the Rozelle Rule did not receive immunity from the antitrust laws because the 
court determined that the parties did not participate in good faith collective bargaining.  Id. 
 98 518 U.S. 231 (1996).  Before granting certiorari in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 
U.S. 231 (1996), the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Williams v. National Basketball 
Association, 518 U.S. 1016 (1996) and Mackey v. National Football League, 434 U.S. 801 
(1977). 
 99 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
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each club to set up a developmental squad.100  These players would 
have been paid a non-negotiable salary of $1,000 per week to play in 
practice games, and sometimes to substitute for injured players.  The 
League bargained to impasse with the National Football League 
Players Association (hereinafter NFLPA) and then unilaterally 
implemented the terms of its last good-faith bargaining offer.  The 
Court determined that the non-statutory labor exemption shielded 
this action from antitrust scrutiny. 
The Court rationalized its determination by noting that labor law 
protects unions from the harm that antitrust law seeks to prevent; 
therefore, there was no harm in granting antitrust immunity where 
labor law policies were being furthered.  It is undisputed in labor 
law, by both the NLRB and the courts, that after impasse, an 
employer can unilaterally implement changes as long as they are no 
more or less favorable than the pre-impasse proposals.101  If an 
employer alters the terms of an implemented provision (from the last 
rejected proposal), that would be considered a failure to bargain in 
good faith and a ULP.102 
In Brown, the Court identified a fundamental problem in the 
application of antitrust law to labor relationships.  It noted that if all 
employers (in the multi-employer bargaining unit) were to impose 
the terms of their last joint offer upon impasse, they would be 
inviting an antitrust lawsuit based on the premise that identical 
behavior may violate the antitrust laws.103  On the other hand, if any 
or all employers, as individuals, would impose their own terms upon 
impasse, they would be inviting a ULP charge.104  This would create 
a situation in which employers could not predict the legal effects of 
their bargaining positions. 
 
 100 This system was called Resolution G-2.  It established that the developmental squad 
would constitute up to six rookie or first year players, who, as free agents, had failed to 
secure a position on the regular player roster. 
 101 Brown, 518 U.S. at 238. 
 102 Id. at 238-39 (where employer has not bargained in good faith, it may not implement 
a term of employment upon impasse). 
 103 Id. at 241. 
 104 Id. at 241-42. 
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The Court held that the non-statutory labor exemption shields a 
multi-employer bargaining unit from antitrust attack when it 
unilaterally implements, after impasse, the terms of its last good-faith 
offer.105  However, the holding was limited.  The ruling stated, 
Our holding is not intended to insulate from antitrust 
review every joint imposition of terms by employers, for 
an agreement among employers could be sufficiently 
distant in time and in circumstances from the collective-
bargaining process that a rule permitting antitrust 
intervention would not significantly interfere with that 
[collective bargaining] process.106 
Although not explicitly, the Court, in essence, applied the Mackey 
Test.  It stated that the agreement grew out of, and was related to, 
the lawful operation of the bargaining process [prong three]. It 
involved a matter that the parties were required to negotiate 
collectively [prong two].  And it concerned only the parties to the 
collective bargaining relationship [prong one].107  The Supreme 
Court decision in Brown has become the final authority on the 
application of the non-statutory labor exemption to professional 
sports restraints. 
IV. IS REVENUE SHARING A MANDATORY OR PERMISSIVE SUBJECT? 
To apply the non-statutory labor exemption to revenue sharing, 
one must first determine whether it is a mandatory or a permissive 
subject.  This determination is necessary because some courts have 
required that the subject be mandatory for the labor exemption to 
apply.108  Others have remained silent on the issue.109  And still 
 
 105 Id. at 235-50. 
 106 Id. at 250. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996); Mackey v. Natl Football 
League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 109 See Natl Hockey League and its Constituent Member Clubs and Natl Hockey 
League Players Assn, (NLRB, Div. of Judges, 1999, unpublished opinion) [hereinafter 
Natl Hockey League Case]. 
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others have extended the labor exemption to permissive subjects that 
are contained in a labor agreement.110  In any case, to determine 
whether the antitrust laws apply to revenue sharing, the question of 
whether revenue sharing is a mandatory or permissive subject should 
be answered. 
The question of whether a revenue-sharing system between owners 
is a mandatory or permissive subject has only been addressed 
once.111  The issue was litigated in National Hockey League and its 
Constituent Member Clubs and National Hockey League Players 
Association, (hereinafter National Hockey League) but the court 
did not make a determination because the NHLPA had waived its 
right to assert its claims.112  Although the court in Wood113 found that 
revenue sharing was a mandatory subject of collective 
bargaining,114 Wood involved sharing between NBA owners and 
players.115  This is an important distinction because the revenue-
sharing program in Wood directly involved player money, whereas in 
National Hockey League, the effect of revenue sharing on player 
salaries was secondary.  A mandatory subject must settle an aspect 
of the relationship between the employer and employees116 and the 
revenue-sharing system this paper is analyzing concerns the owners 
relationship, not the owner-player relationship.  To determine 
whether revenue sharing among owners is a mandatory or permissive 
subject, it is helpful to study National Hockey League because it 
outlines the arguments for both sides. 
 
 110 See Feather v. United Mine Workers of Am., 711 F.2d 530, 542 (3d Cir. 1983); 
James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 593 F. Supp. 915 (D.C. Del. 1984). 
 111 Wood addressed revenue sharing but that involved sharing between players and clubs.  
Also, there were cases that addressed systems instituted to rectify competitive imbalance, 
such as, the Rozelle Rule and the draft, but no cases have address revenue sharing among 
owners specifically.  See Mackey, 543 F.2d 606; Wood v. Natl Basketball Assn, 809 F.2d 
954 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 112 Natl Hockey League Case, supra note 109. 
 113 809 F.2d 954. 
 114 Id. at 962. 
 115 In Wood, the revenue-sharing system allocated a minimum percentage of league 
revenue to the players, thus creating a direct effect on the players.  Id. 
 116 Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass 
Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971). 
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A. National Hockey League and its Constituent Member Clubs and 
National Hockey League Players Association 
In National Hockey League,117 the National Hockey League 
Players Association (hereinafter NHLPA) filed ULP charges for 
various acts by the National Hockey League (hereinafter NHL), 
one of which included a revenue-sharing system.  The revenue-
sharing system was developed because Canadian small-market teams 
were having difficulty retaining their players after free agency, due 
to competition from big-market teams, specifically in the right of 
first refusal context. 
In the NHL, there was a system in place that gave an incumbent 
team the right to offer a player a new contract that included a right of 
first refusal when the contract expired.  This gave the incumbent 
team a right to match another teams offer.118  Offers from other 
teams were often crafted to make it difficult for the incumbent team 
to match.119  As the value of the Canadian dollar dropped against the 
U.S. dollar, the Canadian small-market teams difficulty in retaining 
players increased.  The discrepancy in the value of the Canadian 
dollar impeded the Leagues ability to keep financially successful 
franchises in Canada, and it was necessary that it be dealt with 
through supplemental financing by the NHL.  There were many 
reasons that it was crucial for the League to support having 
financially viable franchises in Canada.  For example, the NHL 
received more television revenue from the seven teams located in 
Canada than it did from the nineteen teams located in the United 
States, not to mention the fact that hockey originated in Canada.120  
To combat this increasing discrepancy, the League proposed a 
program to the NHLPA wherein a Canadian team could match the 
U.S. offer in an equivalent amount of Canadian dollars. 
 
 
 117 Natl Hockey League Case, supra note 109. 
 118 The right of first refusal meant that the incumbent team had a right to match an offer 
by another club within seven days, or in the absence of a matching offer, to draft picks as 
compensation. 
 119 Natl Hockey League Case, supra note 109, at 4. 
 120 Id. 
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The NHLPA rejected this offer and proposed an alternative 
currency equalization plan in which the League and the NHLPA 
would contribute money to a fund to help small-market Canadian 
teams compensate for the currency differential.  There was no 
agreement reached and the currency equalization plan was not 
negotiated again.121 
In July 1995, the NHL Board of Governors unilaterally adopted its 
proposed revenue-sharing system (hereinafter Plan).  It had two 
phases.  Phase One was the Group II Equalization Plan122 wherein 
small-market Canadian teams would receive a subsidy based on a 
precise formula to match the other teams offer so that the incumbent 
could compete for its players.123  Phase Two of the Plan funded 
Canadian teams in the bottom half of League revenues.  There were 
many eligibility requirements for Phase Two, one of which was that 
the teams player payroll had to be at or below the average team 
payroll in the League to receive the full level of assistance.  This was 
referred to as the player payroll provision.  Teams with higher 
player payrolls received less funding.124 
The NHLPA claimed it had no knowledge of the Plan until 
December 22, 1995 when the League faxed a copy of a 
memorandum to the NHLPA detailing the Plan.  However, the Plan 
had been widely publicized prior to December 1995.125  In March 
1996, the NHLPA advised the NHL that they objected to Phases One 
and Two of the Plan, and specifically to the player payroll 
limitations of Phase Two.  In October 1997, the NHL issued a 
resolution that deleted the player payroll aspect of Phase Two 
 
 121 Id. at 5-6. 
 122 The Plan defined the eligible teams as those Canadian teams who match a Group II 
offer sheet from a U.S. team and who are in the bottom two-thirds of the NHL in team 
revenues. 
 123 The formula was: the amount of compensation, converted to Canadian dollars, 
contained in the offer sheet; less the players prior seasons compensation, converted to 
Canadian dollars, or the Canadian teams qualifying offer, converted to Canadian dollars, 
whichever is greater; multiplied by the prevailing conversion rate between Canadian and 
U.S. dollars.  Natl Hockey League Case, supra note 109, at 6.  In the 1995-96 season, the 
League funded Phase One with  $7 million from League generated revenues.  Id. 
 124 Id. at 11.  In the 1996-97 season, funding was estimated at $7.5 million.  Id. 
 125 Id. at 14-18. 
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because the NHL agreed that the provision providing for reductions 
in subsidies based on a clubs payroll exceeding the League average 
payroll, constituted a mandatory subject for the purposes of 
collective bargaining under section 9(a) of the Act.126 
In its findings, the NLRB held that the NHLPA consented to the 
continuation of the other eligibility requirements of Phase Two, 
absent the player payroll requirement.127  Therefore, the League 
did not violate section 8(a)(5) with its implementation of the non-
player payroll provisions of Phase Two.  However, the NHL violated 
8(a)(5) with its implementation of the player payroll provision of 
Phase Two, which had remained in effect from January 1996 until 
October 1997 when the NHL stipulated that the player payroll 
provision was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.128 
The NHLPA argued that Phase One and its revenue-sharing 
system was a mandatory subject because it affected player mobility, 
which is a critical term and condition of employment.129  As 
discussed, the court did not decide the merits of this issue; rather, it 
dismissed the claim by finding that the NHLPAs ULP charge was 
untimely with regard to Phase One, since the filing and service was 
six months and three days after the NHLPA was incontrovertibly on 
notice of the alleged ULP.130 
This case analysis illustrates the typical arguments advanced by 
sports leagues and players associations with regard to a revenue-
sharing system.  Unfortunately, the issue of Phase One was avoided 
in National Hockey League, and it left the following conflicting 
conclusions, either: a) Phase Ones revenue-sharing system was a 
mandatory subject, but the duty to bargain was waived by the Players 
Association; or b) Phase Ones revenue-sharing system was a 
permissive subject, and thus, there was no requirement to bargain, 
regardless  of  the  waiver.    As  a  result,   the  task  of   determining  
 
 126 Id. at 11-12. 
 127 Id. at 19-20. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Natl Hockey League Case, supra note 109, at 12. 
 130 Id. at 18. 
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whether revenue sharing is a mandatory or permissive subject 
remains. 
B. Revenue Sharing Is Not a Mandatory SubjectIt Is Permissive 
Because It Does Not Affect the Players Terms and Conditions  
of Employment 
Section 8(a)(5) and section 8(d) of the NLRA require bargaining 
only with respect to issues that settle an aspect of the relationship 
between the employer and the employee.131  These issues have been 
termed mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, and include 
subjects such as wages, hours and other terms and conditions of 
employment.132  Permissive subjects may be raised at the bargaining 
table to be discussed in good faith, and they may be incorporated into 
an enforceable agreement, but cannot be insisted upon by either party 
at impasse.133  The relationship between revenue sharing and the 
players terms and conditions of employment is too speculative to 
make revenue sharing a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. 
Despite this indirect relationship, some may argue that a revenue-
sharing system does not affect the players terms and conditions of 
employment on its face, but it has the effect of limiting player 
salaries and therefore is mandatory.  In Mackey,134 to determine 
whether the Rozelle Rule was a mandatory subject, the court 
recognized that on its face, the Rozelle Rule does not deal with 
wages, hours and other terms or conditions of employment;135 but the 
practical effect of the Rule restricted player mobility and decreased 
player salaries, and therefore, it was found to be a mandatory subject 
of collective bargaining.136  However, the application of the 
 
 131 Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass 
Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 
356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958). 
 132 Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. at 349. 
 133 Id. 
 134 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 135 See supra Part III-D-1.  The Rozelle Rule is a system that required a franchise, 
signing a player who had played out his option year, to compensate the players former 
franchise. 
 136 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615. 
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practical effect test to revenue sharing is less direct than with the 
Rozelle Rule.  There are two ways that revenue sharing could affect 
the players terms and conditions of employment.  First, if team 
owners are required to share revenue, they will not have as much 
money to pay player salaries.  However, this argument is based on 
the assumption that team owners operate with a limited pool of 
funds. 
Second, team owners might not pay for high-priced players 
because they may not reap the financial rewards of having those 
players on their rosters.  For example, if the Yankees were to sign 
Derek Jeter for an exorbitant amount of money, and were required to 
share local revenues (which arguably would be higher if Jeter were 
on the roster), then the Yankees might lose their incentive to bid on 
such high-priced players.  However, the validity of this argument is 
based on a number of assumptions.  First, that club owners who have 
the money to spend, and would have been willing to spend it absent 
revenue sharing, would not spend it if there was revenue sharing.  
Second, that team owners would only spend money on top players to 
make money.  And third, that television broadcast contracts, 
merchandise licensing contracts, and gate receipts would increase as 
a direct result of signing an individual player. 
The validity of each of these assumptions is questionable.  Club 
owners who have the money, might spend it on player salaries even 
with revenue-sharing measures in effect.137  There are many reasons 
that team owners spend money on particular players aside from 
wanting to reap the financial benefits of having that player on the 
roster, such as their passion for the game,138 having their teams 
perform better in the season, and fulfilling their egos.139  Most 
 
 137 In MLB, since the collective bargaining agreement went into effect with their system 
of revenue sharing, the average player salary has increased from $1.3 million in 1997 to 
almost $2 million in 2000.  Jerry Crasnick, Union Exercises Contract Option Through 2001 
(Aug. 29, 2000), at http://www.detnews.com/2000/tigers/0008/29/sports-112447.htm (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2002). 
 138 Steven H. Lee, Team Owners Sound Off at University of Texas, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS (Apr. 5, 2001) (Mark Cuban, owner of the Dallas Mavericks said, If you dont love 
it as a sport, you wont love it as a business, sports is a business of passion.), at 
http://www.bus.utexas.edu/news/pressreleases/sports_panel.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2002). 
 139 Mike Bianchi, A Hunger Beyond The Game Text, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 10, 
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importantly, much of the external revenue received by team owners 
relates to whether the team is in a big or small market, not whether a 
team has a specific player on the roster.140 
The practical effect of revenue sharing on player contracts is 
arguably too remote to make this a mandatory subject of collective 
bargaining.  Management is only required to bargain over a subject 
when its relation to conditions of employment is close and 
immediate, not remote or merely esthetical.141  Therefore, it is likely 
that revenue sharing is a permissive subject of collective bargaining.  
This paper will now address the issue of the labor exemption as it 
applies to mandatory and/or permissive subjects of collective 
bargaining. 
 
V. WHETHER THE LABOR EXEMPTION APPLIES TO MANDATORY 
AND/OR PERMISSIVE SUBJECTS? 
Although Part IV concluded that revenue sharing is likely to be a 
permissive subject, in practice, it is difficult to predict what a court 
would actually determine because a court has never directly 
addressed this issue.142  In the application of the labor exemption to 
revenue sharing, there are two questions to analyze.  First, if revenue 
sharing is found to be permissive, as this paper has argued, and a 
revenue-sharing provision is negotiated into a labor agreement, 
would the labor exemption apply?  And second, if revenue sharing is 
found to be mandatory, contrary to the conclusions of Part IV, and is  
 
2001, available at 2001 WL 28422425 (stating that owners own sports teams for their egos 
not for business purposes). 
 140 Paul Evan Kovatis, Soaring Baseball Pay Points To Declining Values  Speaking Up, 
THE STAR LEDGER, Mar. 27, 2001, available at 2001 WL 16670394 (reporting that big 
market teams remain unaffected by fans who are bitter about competitive imbalance and 
overpaid players because of their cable television revenues and corporate season ticket 
plans, which almost guarantee the outrageous salaries that the teams are paying their 
players). 
 141 Natl Football League Mgmt. Council and Natl Football League Players Assn, 203 
NLRB 958, 962 (1973), remanded on other grounds, 503 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 142 See supra Part IV. 
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unilaterally implemented by the employer, would the labor 
exemption apply?143 
A. The Labor Exemption Does Not Apply to Permissive Subject 
Provisions in a Labor Agreement 
If revenue sharing is determined to be a permissive subject, it is 
questionable whether the labor exemption would apply when the 
provision is negotiated into a labor agreement.  There is conflicting 
authority as to whether the non-statutory labor exemption applies to 
permissive subjects of collective bargaining when the permissive 
subject provision is in the labor agreement.144 
There are a plethora of cases suggesting that the subject must be 
mandatory to have the labor exemption apply.  In Mackey,145 prong 
two of the three-prong test to determine whether the labor exemption 
applies was that the challenged provision must have been a 
mandatory subject of collective bargaining.146  In Brown,147 the 
Court said that in order to have the labor exemption apply, one of the 
necessary prerequisites was that, it involved a matter that the parties 
were required to negotiate collectively.148  These cases relied upon 
the foundation of the labor exemption in the Supreme Court.  In 
Jewel Tea,149 the Court held that the subject had to be mandatory to 
have the labor exemption apply.  However, the grounds for this last 
holding may be questionable. 
Justice White stated in Jewel Tea, if the unions had made such a 
[permissive] demand and Jewel had agreed and the United States or 
an injured party had challenged the agreement under the antitrust 
 
 143 It is not necessary to analyze the hypothetical scenario if revenue sharing is 
mandatory and it is in the agreement, because it is obvious that the labor exemption would 
apply.  In addition, it is not necessary to analyze if revenue sharing is permissive and not in 
the agreement, because it is obvious that the labor exemption would not apply. 
 144 See Feather v. United Mine Workers of Am., 711 F.2d 530 (3d Cir. 1983); see also 
James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 593 F. Supp. 915 (D.C. Del. 1984). 
 145 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 146 See supra Part III-D-1. 
 147 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
 148 See supra Part III-D-3. 
 149 381 U.S. 676 (1965). 
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laws, we seriously doubt that either the union or Jewel could claim 
immunity by reason of the labor exemption150  The Court relied on 
this statement to determine that the labor exemption applied to the 
marketing-hours provision, because it was mandatory.  Although the 
holding required the subject to be mandatory, the analysis is weak.  
The source of the requirement to make the subject mandatory was 
the Courts  doubt that a permissive subject could be shielded from 
antitrust scrutiny.  Due to the lack of certainty regarding this aspect 
of the rationale, it is necessary to investigate the issue further. 
In Feather v. United Mine Workers of America,151 the court 
recognized that the non-statutory labor exemption generally applies 
when a union, acting with a non-labor party seeks to attain goals 
which are mandatory or permissive subjects of bargaining under the 
National Labor Relations Act, unless the Union acts with predatory 
anti-competitive purpose.152  If this were the standard, a permissive 
subject could receive antitrust immunity as long as there were no 
predatory anti-competitive purposes.  As discussed, the intent of 
revenue sharing is to rectify the competitive imbalance in 
professional sports, which is not a predatory anti-competitive 
purpose.  Rather, its purpose is to prevent the product from becoming 
so unsuccessful that the only alternative is insolvency. 
The court cited the Supreme Court in Connell and Pennington to 
support this proposition, but those decisions did not support the 
courts conclusion.153  In Connell, the Court did not specify whether 
the non-statutory labor exemption applied to permissive as well as 
mandatory subjects.  It only said, a proper accommodation between 
the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under the 
National Labor Relations Act, and the congressional policy favoring 
free competition in business markets requires that some union-
employer agreements be accorded limited non-statutory exemption 
 
 150 Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689 (emphasis added). 
 151 711 F.2d 530 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 152 Feather v. United Mine Workers of Am., 711 F.2d 530, 542 (3d Cir. 1983) (emphasis 
added) (citing Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 
U.S. 616 (1975); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965)). 
 153 Feather v. United Mine Workers of Am., 711 F.2d 530, 542 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing 
Connell, 421 U.S. 616; Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher 
Workmen of N. Am. v. Jewel Tea Co., Inc., 381 U.S. 676, 729-30 (1965)). 
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for antitrust sanctions.154  Similarly, in Pennington, there was 
nothing said that allowed or barred the application of the labor 
exemption to permissive subjects.  However, the rationale used to 
apply the non-statutory labor exemption suggested that the Court 
limited the application of the labor exemption to mandatory subjects.  
It said, wages lie at the heart of those subjects about which 
employers and union must bargain.155  Furthermore, the Court 
suggested that the subject being exempted needed to be more than 
just a mandatory subject to have the non-statutory labor exemption 
apply.  It said, this is not to say that an agreement resulting from 
union-employer negotiations is automatically exempt from Sherman 
Act scrutiny simply because the negotiations involve a compulsory 
subject of bargaining.156  Therefore, it appears as though 
Pennington supports the opposite proposition, which is that the non-
statutory labor exemption only applies to mandatory subjects. 
The court in Feather157 claimed that the labor exemption applied 
to mandatory and permissive subjects of collective bargaining, but 
this proposition was not supported by any of the cases it cited.  
Furthermore, there are no subsequent cases that support the holding.  
Brown158 made it clear that the labor exemption applies only to 
mandatory subjects.  This is the marquee case to determine whether 
the labor exemption applies in the professional sports context.159 
If revenue sharing is determined to be a permissive subject of 
collective bargaining, as was argued in this paper, the non-statutory 
labor exemption would not apply.  Therefore, the antitrust laws 
would be applicable to revenue sharing and the players association 
might have a means of  legal  recourse  via  the  Sherman  Act.   That  
 
 154 Connell, 421 U.S. at 622 (emphasis added) (citing Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676). 
 155 Pennington, 381 U.S. at 664. 
 156 Id. at 665 (emphasis added). 
 157 711 F.2d 530, 542 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 158 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
 159 Id. at 250.  In fact, the Supreme Court held that in order to apply the non-statutory 
antitrust exemption, one of the requirements was that it involved a matter that the parties 
were required to negotiate collectively.  Id. 
COHEN.FINAL 2/15/02  3:00 PM 
642 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 12 
 
does not mean, however, that revenue sharing would necessarily be 
an antitrust violation.160 
B. The Labor Exemption Applies to the Unilateral Imposition of 
Mandatory Subjects after Impasse 
If revenue sharing were determined to be a mandatory subject, 
contrary to the conclusions in this paper, and the system were 
unilaterally imposed by management after impasse, the non-statutory 
labor exemption would apply.  Courts have applied the non-statutory 
labor exemption to mandatory subjects because it promotes federal 
labor policies that favor free and unfettered collective bargaining.161  
The fact that a subject is unilaterally imposed is irrelevant as to 
whether the labor exemption would apply, as long as management 
complies with the other requirements of labor law.162  To comply 
with labor law, management must bargain to impasse and impose 
only the terms of their last good-faith offer. 
In Brown,163 the NFLPA argued that the non-statutory labor 
exemption should not apply where there is no labor-management 
agreement.164  They relied upon the language of Connell, which 
stated that the non-statutory labor exemption applies to union-
employer agreements.165  The Brown Court rejected this 
interpretation of the statement and determined that the Connell Court 
had limited its holding to situations where there was a collective 
bargaining agreement because the Court had not yet had an 
opportunity to address a challenge without an agreement in place.166  
 
 160 This paper will not go through an antitrust analysis of revenue sharing. 
 161 Id. at 236 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(5); 158(d); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-
Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958)). 
 162 Id. at 238.  Both the Board and the Courts have held that, after impasse, labor law 
permits employers unilaterally to implement changes in pre-existing conditions, but only 
insofar as the new terms meet carefully circumscribed conditions.  Id.  These conditions 
were described as incorporating pre-impasse proposals into the unilateral imposition, and 
collective bargaining without committing an unfair labor practice.  Id. at 239. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at 243. 
 165 Id. (citing Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 
U.S. 616, 622 (1975)). 
 166 Id. at 238-39. 
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Furthermore, the Court responded, one cannot mean the principle 
literallythat the exemption applies only to understandings 
embodied in a collective bargaining agreementfor the collective 
bargaining process may take place before the making of an 
agreement or after an agreement has expired.167 
Furthermore, the NFLPA argued that the non-statutory labor 
exemption should not apply without union consent because it leaves 
the union without a means of recourse for self-protection, and it tips 
the bargaining scale in favor of the employer.168  The NFLPA argued 
that this leaves the union with inadequate protection since the union 
was already opposed to the last good-faith offer (which brought 
about the impasse), and the unilateral imposition by the employer 
would still not be a ULP.169  The Players Association was concerned 
that unions might be discouraged from collective bargaining if a 
provision that was unilaterally implemented without union consent 
were shielded from antitrust scrutiny.  The Union argued that the 
effect of the exemption should not counter its purpose to encourage 
collective bargaining.170 
The argument that a union would go unprotected without the 
shield of the labor exemption does not criticize the application of the 
non-statutory labor exemption; rather, it criticizes federal labor law.  
It is established that management can satisfy the good-faith 
bargaining requirement without union consent as long as the parties 
have negotiated in good faith to impasse.171  In NLRB v. Katz, 172 the 
Supreme Court barred an employer from making any unilateral 
changes in existing employment conditions without securing consent 
from, or negotiating to an impasse with the union.173  Once the 
employer has negotiated to impasse, he has the ability to unilaterally 
impose a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; however, the 
 
 167 Id. at 243. 
 168 Steven D. Buchholz, Run Kick, and (Im)passe: Expanding Employers Ability to 
Unilaterally Impose Conditions of Employment After Impasse in Brown v. Pro Football, 81 
MINN. L. REV. 1201 (1997). 
 169 Marvine, supra note 12, at 642. 
 170 Id. at 646. 
 171 Brown, 518 U.S. at 236-50. 
 172 369 U.S. 736 (1962). 
 173 Id. 
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condition must be reasonably comprehended within the employers 
pre-impasse proposals.174  In other words, the employer cannot 
impose more or less favorable terms on the union after impasse.  To 
do so would be considered a ULP and that is the unions 
protection.175 
Unions have always had legal recourse through a ULP charge if an 
employer attempted to unilaterally impose a provision before 
impasse was reached, or if the employer attempted to implement any 
new provisions subsequent to an impasse in negotiations.176  The 
labor exemption must apply post-impasse because if it ceased to 
apply at impasse, it would be too difficult for employers to predict 
the ramifications of their actions since the parties might reach 
impasse numerous times during their negotiations.177  Therefore, if 
revenue sharing is determined to be a mandatory subject of 
bargaining, the non-statutory labor exemption will apply. 
CONCLUSION 
The professional sports industry depends on its club owners and 
leagues to implement systems, such as revenue sharing, in order to 
correct competitive imbalances that exist between teams.  If revenue 
sharing is considered to be a permissive subject, as this paper has 
argued, the non-statutory labor exemption would not apply as an 
antitrust defense for teams or leagues.  On the other hand, if revenue 
sharing is determined to be a mandatory subject, the non-statutory 
labor exemption would apply, even if there was no agreement in 
place, as long as the parties bargained in good faith to impasse.  In 
this paper, it was suggested that leagues should be prepared to defend 
antitrust claims by players associations if revenue sharing is 
determined to be a permissive subject.  As the market value for 
players increases, the wealth disparity between club owners will 
 
 174 Brown, 518 U.S. at 238 (citing Storer Communications, Inc. and Natl Assn of 
Broad. Employees & Technicians, AFL-CIO, 294 NLRB 1056, 1090 (1989); NLRB v. Katz, 
369 U.S. 736, 745 n.12 (1962)). 
 175 Id. at 238-39. 
 176 Id. at 238-50. 
 177 Id. at 245-46. 
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become more apparent.  Over time, this will have a detrimental effect 
on on-the-field competition.  Revenue sharing equalizes the disparity 
among club owners by redistributing wealth to financially weaker 
teams.  By sharing revenues, the goals of owners, leagues and sports 
fans can simultaneously be met. 
 
